Illustrations
Ours is the most technologically dependent nation on earth-we cook in microwave ovens, use automated tellers, watch satellite television, get on-line and surf the Internet. Our burgeoning economy thrives on instantaneous, global electronic transactions. The military depends on space-based assets and precision-guided weaponry for battlefield victory. However, the aggregate affect of these many dependencies has created new, asymmetrical vulnerabilities that may some day be used against us.
My objective in this paper is to critically examine America's strategic level mechanisms to address and counter computer and network based threats to its national information infrastructure. It is my hope it will stimulate discussion, meaningful dialogue, and implementation of further corrective measures to defend this critical infrastructure.
I would like to thank my Air War College faculty advisor, Colonel James Lee, for his encouragement, useful suggestions, and support throughout the course of this project.
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Abstract
This research paper examines the strategic framework for defense of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Explored within the paper are the growing importance and dependency of the United States upon information technology and its associated infrastructure, possible threats to the information infrastructure, the implications of those threats, and currently employed defensive measures and their effectiveness.
In addition, it provides five recommendations for improvements in the national strategic defensive posture: (1) establish a single agency for national information infrastructure defense, (2) establish a baseline regulatory environment, (3) employ core competencies of the DoD, (4) build bridges between Federal, state, and local governments, and (5) utilize DoD as national mentor.
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Ground Zero in Cyberspace
Cyberspace is the battlefield of tomorrow…instead of confronting us head-tohead on the traditional battlefield, adversaries will confront the U.S. at its point of least resistance--our information. By 0800 hours, the impact is widespread and felt throughout the United States. Initial examination by computer scientists indicates the offender is a combination Internet "worm" and "virus," exploiting a common scripting mechanism as the means of attack and propagation.
Further, there are at least 15 reported variants of the worm--each possessing a common underlying software architecture, but displaying discernible distinctions in the precise mechanism of attack. Computer security experts believe this attack may be the result of an "adaptive," or "polymorphic" virus. variants of the worm, confirming it as the worst possible scenario to defend against--an ingeniously devised, maliciously inserted polymorphic worm. In addition, during the night the MAE-East, MAE-Central, and MAE-West Internet switching nodes and the Internet domain naming system (DNS) experienced highly sophisticated electronic attacks and their communications throughput has been reduced to approximately 5% of normal levels-effectively grinding the Internet to a halt. 2 0700 hours, Day 2. With mounting pressure from business, state, and Federal agencies, the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board convenes an emergency meeting to discuss the growing crisis, and formulate a recommendation to the President for how the nation should respond. After their meeting, the recommendation is made that due to the severity, widespread effects, and escalatory nature of the attack, immediate measures must be taken to protect critical infrastructures and prevent further spread of the virus.
Is such a scenario plausible? How widespread would the impact be to the nation? Which Federal agency has the capability and mandate to lead the national response, and direct the actions required for its implementation? This paper will explore the answers to these questions, within the context of methodologies employed to defend the United States' National Information Infrastructure (NII). First, threats to the NII will be examined, along with the implications posed by those threats. Next, the national policy relative to cyberspace security and the information infrastructure, organizations with roles in its defense, and technological approaches for defending the infrastructure will be analyzed. These elements will be examined to determine their effectiveness in providing an adequate national defensive posture. Finally, recommendations will be offered to buttress the overall national computer network defense strategy, to include an expanded role for the Department of Defense.
Threats to the National Information Infrastructure
We cannot and must not make the mistake of assuming that terrorism is the only threat. The next threat we face may indeed be from terrorists, but it could also be cyber war, a traditional state-on-state conflict, or something entirely different.
-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Defining the Context
Information and the infrastructure through which it traverses are ubiquitous in America, touching virtually every segment of national endeavor to some degree. This combined national information infrastructure facilitates commerce, education, government administration, national defense, recreation, and a multitude of other types of information exchange. Joint Pub 1-02 defines this aggregate national information infrastructure as: the nationwide interconnection of communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users. The national information infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment, including cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiber-optic transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component.
A closely related and associated term becoming increasingly familiar to most Americans is "cyberspace," the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks. 4 Cyberspace may be thought of as simply the medium through which information is conveyed via the information infrastructure from originator to recipient. The spectrum of threats from these sources poses significant challenges to defending the National Information Infrastructure from attacks of both internal and external origin. In addition, successful penetrations and attacks against the infrastructure may have significant economic, operational, and national defense implications.
Implications of Attacks
Cybercrime is alive, well, and doing big business in America. 16 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations, defines the Global Information Grid as "The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data security services, and associated services necessary to achieve information weaponry, most of which requires the collection, processing, and transmission of data in some form. Information warfare directed against U.S. systems and networks would have the aim of denying information needed for military operations. This type of warfare could encompass a variety of forms ranging from electronic warfare, psychological operations, deception techniques, offensive computer network attack, to physical destruction of U.S. command and control nodes. After the Gulf War, when everyone was looking forward to eternal peace, a new military revolution emerged. This revolution is essentially a transformation from the mechanized warfare of the industrial age to the information warfare of the information age. Information warfare is a war of decisions and control, a war of knowledge, and a way of intellect. The aim of information warfare will be gradually changed from "preserving oneself and wiping out the enemy" to "preserving oneself and controlling the opponent.." Under today's technological conditions, the "all conquering stratagems" of Sun Tzu more than two millennia ago--"vanquishing the enemy without fighting" and subduing the enemy by "soft strike" or "soft destruction"--could finally be truly realized.
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To counter these potential threats to the nation's information infrastructure, an extensive and growing policy, organizational, and technological framework exists. This framework constitutes the strategic foundation harnessing national resources in response to these threats. 
Chapter 3
Approaches for Defending the National Information Infrastructure
We have evidence that a large number of countries around the world are developing the doctrine, strategies, and tools to conduct information attacks on military-related computers.
-John M. Deutsch, Director, CIA
Strategic/National Level Framework
The national policy and organizational framework for computer network defense has undergone virtually continuous evolution since the mid-90s. In addition, the tragic 9-11 attacks against the Pentagon and World Trade Center further crystallized interest in protecting critical infrastructures, spawning a surge of new legislation, organizations, and interest in supporting technologies. Understanding of the national strategic defensive framework requires an examination of the extensive mosaic of underlying policy. Table 1 provides a chronology of key policy instruments related to defense of the National Information Infrastructure.
Executive Order 13010 began the process by establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). The commission conducted its initial examination into the state of critical national infrastructures, to include the information infrastructure, rendering an inaugural report in 1997. This report concluded America's technology dependence rendered it vulnerable to cyber-threats, identified a "lack of awareness" within the government concerning the existence and severity of this threat, and concluded national defensive measures should be a cooperative effort between the public and private sectors. This extensive body of policy and organizations provides a basic structure for management and defense of the national information infrastructure. Similarly, the underlying technological framework provides the flesh and blood giving our national defensive capability its substance.
Computer Network Defense Supporting Technology
The technological foundation supporting the defense of the information infrastructure is comprised of a complex array of physical, electronic, software, and procedural elements. While a detailed discussion of the technological underpinning of computer and network security is beyond the scope of this paper, the elements most commonly used in both the private and public sectors will be briefly examined.
Physical defensive measures include those actions taken to prevent unauthorized users from obtaining physical access to computer equipment and networks. Thus far, key policy, organizational, and technological components employed to defend the national information infrastructure have been examined. In this section, the effectiveness of these elements will be scrutinized to assess their adequacy in providing adequate defense of the information infrastructure.
Evaluation Criteria
The metrics used to establish benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of computer network However, the GAO did not address one of the most pronounced shortcomings of the strategy. Although the document will no doubt meet the letter of the law in providing a national strategy, it unfortunately suffers from the notable deficiency of being a "paper tiger," lacking any statute authority to direct implementation of its numerous recommendations.
This unfortunate result directly stems from PDD 63 itself, which calls for only coordinating authority, and encouraged participation, by private sector infrastructure segments.
While these are worthwhile goals, it is unclear if private sector infrastructure segments will voluntarily submit to its recommendations for securing their networks and systems if a substantial expenditure of resources is required. However, our increasing vulnerability points to the need for a more structured management approach. The overall effectives of the national strategy would be enhanced by some degree of underlying mandated compliance, combined with a program of private sector compliance incentives, to ensure minimum standards for nation-wide security are achieved.
Need for improved analysis and warning capabilities. Similarly, The National
Infrastructure Protection Center, operated by the FBI, was chartered under PDD 63 as the nation's nerve center for warning and assessment for infrastructure protection, and is empowered to issue warnings and guidance to owners and operators of critical infrastructure components.
However, that organization's effectiveness has been hampered by the lack of an analytic framework with which to assess strategic infrastructure attacks, personnel shortages, and limited nation wide understanding of its intended purpose.
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Once again, the GAO described the symptom but only partially identified the underlying cause. The lack of statute authority to direct actions be taken in response to significant threats is a key deficiency in establishing a viable national defense structure. The absence of an underlying statutory standards framework for key infrastructure components is a substantial deficiency, which must be resolved. 
Need for improved information sharing.
Persistent pervasive weaknesses in Federal computer systems. GAO auditors identified
the need for improvements and an overall strategy to resolve security weaknesses in Federal computer systems. The GAO viewed a central aspect of this problem as the lack of an overarching security strategy within the Federal government, coupled with often-unclear roles and responsibilities. 33 As discussed earlier, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides at least an initial starting point for an integrative Federal strategy, but must be coupled with corresponding security programs within each agency to resolve their respective deficiencies. 
Network Incident Data
In addition to deficiencies that must be resolved in the current national policy and organizational structures, existing infrastructure defensive strategies, as measured by the incidence of reported attacks, are ineffective and require significant improvement. Figure 1 summarizes incidents reported to the CERT during the years 1997 through the third quarter of Finally, even though the events of 9-11 raised awareness and resulted in some infrastructure security improvements in the U.S., this trend has been far from universal. An August 2002
SearchSecurity.com survey of 500 corporate security and IT personnel reported more than half of the surveyed organizations have seen no improvement in their organization's security posture since the attacks of 9-11. 38 Although the trend is better in the Federal sector, with 71% of Federal agencies reporting improved security, 29% indicated no significant improvements had occurred in their agencies since 9-11.
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Field Interviews and Discussions
During my research for this paper, I also had the pleasure of discussing views on protection of the national information infrastructure with several private sector and Federal subject matter strengths, according to Mr. Goldsby, is "the ability to deliver tailored solutions quickly" to meet the information security needs of organizations. He observes that the most promising method by which the Federal government can stimulate private sector development and deployment of enhanced security technologies needed to buttress information infrastructure defense is through more Federal grants for basic research. 41 Both of these areas are promising and have significant potential for improving overall infrastructure security, could be integrated into an overall publicprivate sector partnership program, and should be the subject of further research.
In addition, during the development of this paper, my research period for this project 
Personal Experiences
Based on over two and a half decades of practical experience in information technology, coupled with analysis of available data compiled during research for this project, my assessment is that the overall state of national information infrastructure security, although marginally improved during the last decade and showing increased emphasis since 9-11, requires additional systematic attention to afford adequate protection to this critical national resource. In this regard, while the GAO recommendations discussed earlier did not go far enough in some areas, their overall observations correctly captured the most significant issues adversely affecting infrastructure defense.
From my direct observations and experience of the Air Force computer network operations environment, the most significant problems which must be resolved those of: (1) "human capital," e.g. sustaining and equipping an adequately trained computer operations technical force, and (2) disciplined, systematic utilization of available technological tools.
First, military manpower shortages and increasing military operations tempo create significant challenges for understaffed network operations centers to sustain day-to-day operations. Additional research is needed to determine possible solutions to this problem, e.g.
bonuses, incentives, privatization, etc.
Second, Air Force organizations for the most part have the basic technical tools needed to secure the military's portion of the national information infrastructure. Unfortunately, the areas not addressed by these tools continue to create problems. An area where this is particularly problematic is that of security update/patch management. And while some installations have partially automated this process, and GSA contract vehicles for patch management are now available, more adaptive, less manpower intensive automated tools are needed. 
Recommendations
America is successful because of the hard work, creativity, and enterprise of our people -President George W. Bush
While our nation has begun the journey to secure its critical infrastructures, we have not yet reached the destination. In view of the significant changes occurring throughout the Federal government since 9-11 to buttress infrastructure security of all types, we are at a key juncture to implement additional improvements building upon those already taken. The recent creation of the cabinet level Department of Homeland Security holds great promise to simplify the consolidation, streamlining, and simplifying of the national structure for critical infrastructure defense against both physical and electronic attack. In addition, a tremendous potential for private and public sector synergism exists, which if exploited could result in significant improvements in the nation's infrastructure defense. To implement these improvements, five recommendations are suggested, expanding upon and providing solutions to the problems framed by the GAO-resolving structural, indications/warning, information sharing, and overall systemic security deficiencies.
Recommendation 1: Establish a single agency for information infrastructure defense
Changes are required to the current organizational framework for protection of the national information infrastructure. As addressed earlier, there are currently 50 organizations with roles in infrastructure protection, and broad agreement exists that a central entity is needed to achieve unity of effort. 43 No evidence was found that any single agency has the statute authority to direct the scope of actions that would be required to mount the defense to a strategic assault on the information infrastructure. 44 This would cause confusion, delay, and unpredictable outcomes in the event of a scenario such as this treatise posited in its opening paragraphs. In light of its role in protecting the nation, a logical candidate for this function would be the new Department of Homeland Security. Designation of this agency for this role would consolidate response actions for infrastructure protection within one agency, engender unity of action in the event rapid response is needed to react to strategic level events, and provide one universally recognized governmental organization for private sector interface and coordination.
Recommendation 2: Establish a baseline regulatory environment
Thus far, the Internet has largely been unregulated, decentralized, and relatively unconstrained by government intervention or regulation. However, the increasing inability to prevent, contain, and adequately respond to information infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities warrants more scrutiny, and at least minimal implementation of nationwide guidelines.
Improvement is needed in two major areas: (1) the provision of a common set of computer and There are currently over 4,000 active Internet service providers and over 165,000 Internet points of presence registered in the U.S. and Canada, forming the bulk of the domestic information infrastructure.
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These Internet service providers operate under varying, selfregulated degrees of security, and require some measure of foundational security standards to guard the overall integrity of the domestic backbone network. improving environmental performance. Both private and public sectors benefit through better overall environmental compliance, energy savings, and awareness.
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Implementation of a similar partnership program for information infrastructure security would have similar benefits and achieve the objectives delineated in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. While it is recognized there are concerns over Internet privacy issues and increased governmental control that must be addressed, a basic foundation of standards is essential to raising the overall level of security within the information infrastructure. Additional study is needed to address these issues, devise an optimum structure for public-private interaction, and determine the type of incentives that should be employed.
Recommendation 3: Utilize Core Competencies of the DoD
In consonance This architecture has proven highly effective in detecting attempted network penetrations, and should be employed both as a data source in a centralized national control and monitoring scheme, and also as a model for other infrastructure segments.
Hierarchical network management
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace recommends the creation of a national A key benefit of this architecture would be development of a capability to receive, characterize, and disseminate response actions rapidly throughout the national infrastructure. at all levels throughout its structure. These programs address all aspects of computer security, from definition of organizational security policies, assessment, accreditation and certification of systems, to comprehensive user training. It is likely many of these programs could in part or total be exported to other segments of the infrastructure for their use in developing enterprise information security programs.
The use of Exercises
Finally, the use of exercises should be increased to provide a realistic environment within which to evaluate and plan responses to possible attacks on the information infrastructure. Working with the local municipality, every aspect of planning for the Y2K issue, to include "worst-case," "what if" scenarios, was conducted. In each case, local officials were more than willing to both accept recommendations, and dialogue with the DoD, regarding solutions for addressing contingency scenarios. Drawing upon these type partnerships that were established throughout the U.S. could serve as an excellent starting point for DoD mentorship in infrastructure security, and could expand to include other critical infrastructure sectors such as water, electric power, transportation, and public health services. Such efforts would have the dual benefit of bolstering the defensive posture of key national infrastructures, as well as strengthening relations between the DoD and local governments for the common good.
Recommendation 5: Utilize DoD as National Mentor
One of the central tenets of The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is that of creating an infrastructure security environment in which the Federal government serves as the model for other segments of the infrastructure. Although DoD's current engagement and deployment of its resources in the global war against terrorism could limit its capabilities, its long experience with securing critical information and infrastructures ideally equips it to serve as a national guide, or mentor. It is envisioned the DoD could serve in this capacity through liaison with the Department of Homeland Security, until that organization is fully implemented and capable of leading the national defensive effort.
Nationally, we are at a critical juncture in light of 9-11. While terrorists are currently not employing cyberspace methods to attack the U.S, the potential asymmetrical advantage such attacks would afford cannot be discounted. Implementing improvements in the national policy structure, creating a baseline regulatory environment, leveraging DoD's extensive experience, and building bridges to other infrastructure segments and governments with overall DoD mentorship, promises to point America in the right direction to accomplish the goals of The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
Perhaps a fitting culmination of this paper is writing the final chapter to its opening scenario.
If the recommendations posited in this examination stimulate discussion leading to improvements in the nation's ability to defend its information infrastructure, it is likely the ending to this fictional scenario would be recorded in this manner: 1600 hours, Day 1. The nation quickly returned to normal after countering the potential threat from the recent attack launched against its information infrastructure. Stemming from substantial improvements to America's capability to defend its critical infrastructures incident to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the National Cyberspace Operations Center (NCOC), baseline security standards, and enhanced national indications and warning structure, a joint Federal-private sector response team quickly formulated a defense rendering the polymorphic "super" virus ineffective. Using the nationwide link from the NCOC to ISPs and Internet carriers, the fix was rapidly disseminated and the threat contained before any significant damage could occur. The President expressed his appreciation to the Special Advisor for
Cyberspace Security, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, and all members of the infrastructure protection team for the success of the effort.
In conclusion, America has been given a rare opportunity in modern warfare--the chance to prepare itself for an asymmetrical assault certain to come on an as of yet unknown electronic battlefield. With an effective national strategy, coupled with synergistic public and private sector effort, we will transform ourselves to achieve these objectives--simultaneously ensuring America is ready for the challenges of 21 st century information-realm warfare. 
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